In this paper, we introduce a novel rule for synthesis of reactive systems, applicable to systems made of n components which have each their own objectives. This rule is based on the notion of admissible strategies. We compare this rule with previous rules defined in the literature, and show that contrary to the previous proposals, it defines sets of solutions which are rectangular. This property leads to solutions which are robust and resilient, and allows one to synthesize strategies separately for each agent. We provide algorithms with optimal complexity and also an abstraction framework compatible with the new rule.
Introduction
The automatic synthesis of reactive systems has recently attracted a considerable attention. The theoretical foundations of most of the contributions in this area rely on two-player zero sum games played on graphs: one player (player 1) models the system to synthesize, and the other player (player 2) models its environment. The game is zero-sum: the objective of player 1 is to enforce the specification of the system while the objective of player 2 is the negation of this specification. This is a worst-case assumption: because the cooperation of the environment cannot be assumed, we postulate that it is antagonistic.
A fully adversarial environment is usually a bold abstraction of reality. Nevertheless, it is popular because it is simple and sound: a winning strategy against an antagonistic player is winning against any environment which pursues its own objective. But this approach may fail to find a winning strategy even if there exist solutions when the objective of the environment Supported by the ERC starting Grant inVEST (FP7-279499).
is taken into account. Also, this model is for two players only: system vs environment. In practice, both the system and the environment may be composed of several parts to be constructed individually or whose objectives should be considered one at a time. In fact, many systems, such as telecommunication protocols, and distributed algorithms are made of several components or processes, each having its own objective which may or may not conflict other components' objectives. Consider, for instance, a communication network in which each node has the objective of transmitting a message to a subset of other nodes, using some preferred frequency range; the objectives of some nodes may not conflict at all if they are independent (using different frequencies), while some of them may be in conflict. Indeed, game theory is used to model such situations; see e.g. [20] . Such problems are the subject of non-zero sum games where each entitiy having its own objective is seen as a different player (a.k.a. agent). For controller synthesis within this context, it is thus crucial to take different players' objectives into account when synthesizing strategies; accordingly, alternative notions have been proposed in the literature.
A first classical alternative is to weaken the winning condition of player 1 using the objective of the environment, requiring the system to win only when the environment meets its objective. This approach together with its weaknesses have been discussed in [3] , we will add to that later in the paper. A second alternative is to use concepts from n-players non-zero sum games. This is the approach taken both by assume-guarantee synthesis [7] (AG), and by rational synthesis [18] (RS). For two players, AG relies on secure equilibria [9] (SE), a refinement of Nash equilibria [28] (NE). In SE, objectives are lexicographic: players first try to maximize their own specifications, and then try to falsify the specifications of others. It is shown in [9] that SE are those NE which represent enforceable contracts between the two players. However the AG rule as extended to several players in [7] no longer corresponds to secure equilibria.
This was not noticed in [7] , so the algorithm proposed for computing secure equilibria does not actually apply for the AG rule. The difference between AG and SE is that AG strategies have to be resiliant to deviations of all the other players, while SE profiles have to be resiliant to deviations by only one player.
In RS, the system is assumed to be monolithic and the environment is made of components that are partially controllable. In RS, we search for a profile of strategies where the system ensures its objective and the players that model the environment are given an "acceptable" strategy profiles, from which it is assumed that they will not deviate. "Acceptable" is formalized by any solution concept, e.g. by NE, dominating strategies (Dom), or subgame perfect equilibria (SPE).
Contributions

1.
As a first and central contribution, we propose a novel notion of synthesis where we take into account different players' objectives using the concept of admissible strategies [2, 4, 5] . For a player with objective φ, a strategy σ is dominated by σ if σ does as well as σ w.r.t. φ against all strategies of the other players, and better for some of those strategies. A strategy σ is admissible if it is not dominated by another strategy. In [2] , the notion of admissibility was lifted to games played on graphs, and algorithmic questions left open were solved in [5] , with the goal of model checking the set of outcomes that survive the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Here, we use this notion to derive a meaningful notion to synthesize systems with several components using multi-player games, with the following idea. Rational players should only play admissible strategies since dominated strategies are clearly suboptimal. In assume-admissible synthesis (AA), we make the assumption that players play admissible strategies. Then for each player, we search for an admissible strategy that is winning against all admissible strategies of other players. AA is sound: any strategy profile in which each strategy is admissible and winning against admissible strategies of other players, satisfies the objectives of all the players (Theorem 1). 2. We compare different synthesis rules from the literature: First, we apply all the rules on a simple but representative example, and show the main advantages of AA w.r.t. the other rules (Sect. 4). Then we compare systematically the different approaches to show when a solution for one rule implies a solution for another rule (Fig. 5) , and we prove that, contrary to other rules, AA yields rectangular sets of solutions (Theorem 8). We argue that the rectangularity property is essential for practical applications. 3. As a third contribution, we provide algorithms to decide the existence of assumeadmissible winning strategy profiles and prove the optimal complexity of our algorithm (Theorem 3): PSPACE-complete for Müller, and PTIME for Büchi objectives. We also give an algorithm for the rule AG with multiple players, which was missing in the literature (Theorem 6). 4. As a last important contribution, we provide an abstraction framework which allows us to define sufficient conditions to compute sets of winning assume-admissible strategies for each player in the game compositionally (Theorem 5). The use of state-space abstraction is essential in order to make the methods scale to large systems; we follow the abstract interpretation framework [13, 21] . Moreover, combining abstraction and rectangularity, one can also decompose the problem into smaller problems to be solved for each player. The idea is to look for a strategy profile witnessing the AA rule by computing each strategy separately, which is possible by rectangularity. For each player i, we consider an abstraction of the state space, and give a sufficient condition for finding a strategy for player i by only using computations on the abstract state space. The idea is close to [17] in spirit, but we need a specialized algorithm to approximate the set of admissible strategies. We thus avoid exploring the state space of the original game. This approach is compositional in the following sense: for each player i, a different abstraction can be chosen, which is tailored for player i, and its strategy is computed independently of the other players' strategies. Thus, to find a strategy profile, this abstraction technique is applied to each player one by one, and if all steps succeed in finding strategies, we obtain a strategy profile that satisfies the AA rule.
Additional pointers to related works
We have already mentioned assume-guarantee synthesis [7] and rational synthesis [18, 24] . Those are the closest related works to ours as they pursue the same scientific objective: they propose a framework to synthesize strategy profiles for non-zero sum multi-player games by taking into account the specification of each player. As those works are defined for similar formal setting, we are able to provide formal statements in the core of the paper that add elements of comparison with our work.
In [17] , Faella studies several alternatives to the notion of winning strategy including the notion of admissible strategy. His work is for two-players only, and only the objective of one player is taken into account, the objective of the other player is left unspecified. Faella uses the notion of admissibility to define a notion of best-effort in synthesis while we use the notion of admissibility to take into account the objectives of the other players in an n player setting where each player has his own objective.
The notion of admissible strategy is definable in strategy logics [10, 27] and decision problems related to the AA rule can be reduced to satisfiability queries in such logics. Nevertheless this would not lead to worst-case optimal algorithms. Based on our previous work [5] , we develop in this paper worst-case optimal algorithms.
In [14] , Damm and Finkbeiner use the notion of dominant strategy to provide a compositional semi-algorithm for the (undecidable) distributed synthesis problem. So while we use the notion of admissible strategy, they use a notion of dominant strategy. The notion of dominant strategy is strictly stronger: every dominant strategy is admissible but an admissible strategy is not necessary dominant. Also, in multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives with complete information (as considered here), admissible strategies are always guaranteed to exist [2] while it is not the case for dominant strategies. We will show in an example that the notion of dominant strategy is too strong for our purpose. Also, note that the objective of Damm and Finkbeiner is different from ours: they use dominance as a mean to formalize a notion of best-effort for components of a distributed system w.r.t. their common objective, while we use admissibility to take into account the objectives of the other components when looking for a winning strategy for one component to enforce its own objective. Additionally, our formal setting is different from their setting in several respects. First, they consider zero-sum games between a distributed team of players (processes) against a unique environment, each player in the team has the same specification (the specification of the distributed system to synthesize) while the environment is considered as adversarial and so its specification is the negation of the specification of the system. In our case, each player has his own objective and we do not distinguish between protagonist and antagonist players. Second, they consider distributed synthesis: each individual process has its own view of the system while we consider games with perfect information in which all players have a complete view of the system state. Finally, let us point out that Damm and Finkbeiner use the term admissible for specifications and not for strategies (as already said, they indeed consider dominant strategies and not admissible strategies). In our case, we use the notion of admissible strategy which is classical in game theory, see e.g. [4, 19] . This vocabulary mismatch is unfortunate but we decided to stick to the term of "admissible strategy" which is well accepted in the literature, and already used in several previous works on (multi-player) games played on graphs [2, 5, 17] .
A preliminary version of this work was published in [6] .
Structure of the paper Section 2 contains definitions. In Sect. 3, we review synthesis rules introduced in the literature and define assume-admissible synthesis. In Sect. 4, we consider an example; this allows us to underline some weaknesses of the previous rules. Section 5 contains algorithms for Büchi and Müller objectives, and while Sect. 6 presents the abstraction techniques applied to our rule. Section 7 presents the algorithm for the assume-guarantee rule. Section 8 presents a formal comparison of the different rules.
Definitions
Multiplayer arenas
A turn-based multiplayer arena is a tuple A = P, (S i ) i∈P , s init , (Act i ) i∈P , δ where P is a finite set of players; for i ∈ P, S i is a finite set of player i states; we let S = i∈P S i ; s init ∈ S is the initial state; for every i ∈ P, Act i is the set of player i actions; we let Act = i∈P Act i ; and δ : S × Act → S is the transition function. 
Strategies A strategy of player i is a function σ i : (S * · S i ) → Act i . A strategy profile for the set of players P ⊆ P is a tuple of strategies, one for each player of P. We write −i for the set P\{i }. Let i (A) be the set of the strategies of player i in A, written i if A is clear from context, and P the strategy profiles of P ⊆ P. A set A ⊆ P of strategy profiles is rectangular if it can be written as A = i∈P A i where A i ⊆ i . An outcome ρ is compatible with strategy σ for player i if for all j ≥ 1, ρ j ∈ S i and act j (ρ) = σ (ρ ≤ j ). It is compatible with strategy profile σ P if it is compatible with each σ i for i ∈ P. The outcome of a strategy profile σ P is the unique outcome compatible with σ P starting at s init , denoted Out A (σ P ). For any state s, we write Out A,s (σ P ) for the outcome starting at state s. For any history h, we write Out A,h (σ P ) for the outcome starting at state last(s), concatenated to h; formally, Out A,h (σ P ) = h ≤|h|−1 · Out A,last(h) (σ P ). Given σ P ∈ P with P ⊆ P, let Out A (σ P ) denote the set of outcomes compatible with σ P , and extend it to Out A ( ) where is a set of strategy profiles. For E ⊆ S i × Act i , let Strat i (E) denote the set of player i strategies σ that only use actions in E in all outcomes compatible with σ .
Objectives and games
An objective φ is a subset of outcomes. An objective is prefix-independent if all suffixes of outcomes in φ belong to φ. Formally, for all outcomes ρ ∈ φ, for all k ≥ 1, we have ρ ≥k ∈ φ. A strategy σ i of player i is winning for objective
A game is an arena equipped with an objective for each player, written G = A, (φ i ) i∈P where for each player i, φ i is an objective. Given a strategy profile σ P for the set of players P, we write G, σ P | φ if Out A (σ P ) ⊆ φ. We write Out G (σ P ) = Out A (σ P ), and Out G = Out G ( ). For any coalition C ⊆ P, and objective φ, we denote by Win C (A, φ) the set of states s such that there exists σ C ∈ C with Out G,s (σ C ) ⊆ φ.
Although we prove some of our results for general objectives, we give algorithms for ω-regular objectives represented by Muller conditions. A Muller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: φ i = {ρ | Inf(ρ) ∈ F }. Following [22] , we assume that F is given by a Boolean circuit whose inputs are S, which evaluates to true exactly on valuations encoding subsets S ∈ F . We also use linear temporal logic (LTL) [30] to describe objectives. LTL formulas are defined by φ := Gφ | Fφ | Xφ | φUφ | φWφ | S where S ⊆ S (we refer to [16] for the semantics). We consider the special case of Büchi objectives, given by GF(B) = {ρ | B ∩ Inf(ρ) = ∅}. Boolean combinations of formulas GF(S) define Muller conditions representable by polynomial-size circuits.
Dominance
In any game G, a player i strategy σ i is dominated by σ i if for all
this is classically called weak dominance, but we call it dominance for simplicity). A strategy which is not dominated is admissible. Thus, admissible strategies are maximal, and incomparable, with respect to the dominance relation. We write Adm i (G) for the set of admissible strategies in i , and Adm P (G) = i∈P Adm i (G) the product of the sets of admissible strategies for P ⊆ P.
Strategy σ i is dominant if for all σ i , and
The set of dominant strategies for player i is written Dom i (G). A Nash equilibrium for G is a strategy profile σ P such that for all i ∈ P, and σ i ∈ i , G, σ −i , σ i | φ i implies G, σ P | φ i ; thus no player can improve its outcome by deviating from the prescribed strategy. A Nash equilibrium for G from s, is a Nash equilibrium for G where the initial state is replaced by s. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for G is a strategy profile σ P such that for all histories h, (σ i • h) i∈P is a Nash equilibrium in G from state last(h), where given a strategy σ , σ • h denotes the strategy that follows σ starting at history h,
Synthesis rules
In this section, we review synthesis rules proposed in the literature, and introduce a novel one: the assume-admissible synthesis rule (AA). Unless stated otherwise, we fix for this section a game G, with players P = {1, . . . , n} and their objectives φ 1 , . . . , φ n .
Rule Coop: The objectives are achieved cooperatively if there is a strategy profile
This rule [12, 26] asks for a strategy profile that jointly satisfies the objectives of all the players. This rule makes very strong assumptions: players fully cooperate and strictly follow their respective strategies. This concept is not robust against deviations and postulates that the behavior of every component in the system is controllable. This weakness is well-known: see e.g. [7] where the rule is called weak co-synthesis.
Rule Win. The objectives are achieved adversarially if there is a strategy profile
This rule does not require any cooperation among players at all: the rule asks to synthesize for each player i a strategy which enforces his/her objective φ i against all possible strategies of the other players. Strategy profiles obtained by Win are extremely robust: each player is able to ensure his/her objective no matter how the other players behave. Unfortunately, this rule is often not applicable in practice: often, none of the players has a winning strategy against all possible strategies of the other players. The next rules soften this requirement by taking into account the objectives of other players.
Rule Win-under-Hyp: Given a two-player game G with P = {1, 2} in which player 1 has objective φ 1 , player 2 has objective φ 2 , player 1 can achieve adversarially φ 1 under hypothesis φ 2 , if there is a strategy σ 1 for player 1 such that G,
The rule winning under hypothesis applies for two-player games only. Here, we consider the synthesis of a strategy for player 1 against player 2 under the hypothesis that player 2 behaves according to his/her specification. This rule is a relaxation of the rule Win as player 1 is only expected to win when player 2 plays so that the outcome of the game satisfies φ 2 . While this rule is often reasonable, it is fundamentally plagued by the following problem: instead of trying to satisfy φ 1 , player 1 could try to falsify φ 2 , see e.g. [3] . This problem disappears if player 2 has a winning strategy to enforce φ 2 , and the rule is then safe. We come back to that later in the paper (see Lemma 1) .
Assume guarantee Chatterjee et al. in [7] proposed synthesis rules inspired by Win-underHyp that avoid the aforementioned problem. The rule was originally proposed in a model with two components and a scheduler. We study here two natural extensions for n players.
Rules AG
∧ and AG ∨ : The objectives are achieved by (AG ∧ ) assume-guarantee-∧ if there exists a strategy profile σ P such that
there exists a strategy profile σ P such that
The two rules differ in the second requirement: AG ∧ requires that player i wins whenever all the other players win, while AG ∨ requires player i to win whenever one of the other player wins. Clearly AG ∨ is stronger, and the two rules are equivalent for two-player games.
As shown in [9] , for two-player games, a profile of strategy for AG ∧ (or AG ∨ ) is a Nash equilibrium in a derived game where players want, in lexicographic order, first to satisfy their own objectives, and then as a secondary objective, want to falsify the objectives of the other players. As NE, AG ∧ and AG ∨ require players to synchronize on a particular strategy profiles. As we will see, this is not the case for the new rule that we propose.
Rational synthesis [18] and [24] introduce two versions of rational synthesis (RS). In the two cases, one of the player, say player 1, models the system while the other players model the environment. The existential version (RS ∃ ) searches for a strategy for the system, and a profile of strategies for the environment, such that the objective of the system is satisfied, and the profile for the environment is stable according to some solution concept; here we consider the most classical ones, namely, NE, SPE, or Dom. The universal version (RS ∀ )
searches for a strategy for the system, such that for all environment strategy profiles that are stable according to the solution concept, the objective of the system holds. We write NE
) for the set of strategy profiles σ −1 = (σ 2 , σ 3 , . . . , σ n ) that are NE (resp. SPE) equilibria in the game G when player 1 plays σ 1 , and Dom G,σ 1 for the set of strategy profiles σ −1 where each strategy σ j , 2 ≤ j ≤ n, is dominant in the game G when player 1 plays σ 1 .
Rules RS
∃,∀ (NE, SPE, Dom): Let γ ∈ {NE, SPE, Dom}, the objective is achieved by:
(RS ∃ (γ )) existential rational synthesis under γ if there is a strategy σ 1 of player 1, and
Clearly, (RS ∀ (γ )) is stronger than (RS ∃ (γ )) and more robust. As RS ∃,∀ (NE, SPE) are derived from NE and SPE, they require players to synchronize on particular strategy profiles.
Novel rule, assume-admissible We now present our novel rule based on the notion of admissible strategies. Rule AA: The objectives are achieved by assume-admissible (AA) strategies if there is a strategy profile σ P such that:
A player-i strategy satisfying conditions 1 and 2 above is called assume-admissiblewinning (AA-winning). A profile of AA-winning strategies is an AA-winning strategy profile. The rule AA requires that each player has a strategy winning against admissible strategies of other players. So we assume that players do not play strategies which are dominated, which is reasonable as dominated strategies are clearly suboptimal options. Notice that unlike in NE or SPE, players are not required to agree on a given equilibrium profile; they only need to assume the admissibility of the strategies played by other players.
Note that an adversarial environment can be easily considered in the assume-admissible rule: it suffices to add a player with a trivial objective (i.e. always winning). The set of admissible strategies will be the whole set of strategies for that player, and other players will then be required to satisfy their objectives against any strategy of this player.
The definition of AA does not explicitly require that the strategy profile satisfies all players' objectives; but this is a consequence of the definition:
Proof Let σ P be a strategy profile witness of AA. Let i be a player, we have that σ −i ∈ Adm −i (G), because by Condition 1, for all j = i, σ j ∈ Adm j (G). Then by Condition 2 we have that G, σ P | φ i . Since this is true for all players i, we have that G, σ P | i∈P φ i .
The following example shows that AA-winning strategies must be admissible themselves for Proposition 1 to hold.
Example 1
In AA, the profile of strategy must be composed of admissible strategies only. This is necessary as otherwise assumptions of the players on each other may not be satisfied. This is illustrated by the example of Fig. 1 in which the two players have reachability objectives φ 1 = F(s 4 ∨ s 6 ) and φ 2 = F(s 4 ) respectively.
Admissible strategies are shown in plain edges. Now, the player 2 strategy that chooses the dashed edge from s 2 satisfies Condition 2 of AA, since s 2 is not reachable under admissible strategies of player 1. Similarly, the player 1 strategy that chooses the dashed edge from s 1 satisfies Condition 2 of AA since the thick edges lead back to a state satisfying φ 1 . But then the resulting profile is such that none of the two players wins.
Synthesis rules in the light of an example
We illustrate the synthesis rules on a multiplayer game which models a real-time scheduler with two tasks. The system is composed of three players, namely, User, Controller, and Scheduler. The high-level description of the system is the following: User sends actions a 1 or a 2 to Controller, which having received action a i must eventually send a corresponding request r i to Scheduler. The role of Scheduler is to schedule events: having received r i , it must issue the event q i while meeting some temporal constraints.
More precisely, we model the system as a multiplayer game. Accordingly, each round consists of three steps: first, User chooses a valuation for a 1 We will keep k as a parameter. These requirements can be expressed in LTL as follows:
Notice that since each round takes three steps, X 4 This strategy profile is clearly not desirable since it allows for exactly one scenario satisfying the objectives, while under any change in one component's behavior, all objectives fail. Moreover, the outcome does not depend at all on the behavior of User. It is intuitively easy to see that better strategy profiles exist: in fact, both components could continue to "try to satisfy" their objectives in all cases rather than switching toσ C orσ S which is guaranteed to make all objectives fail. Clearly such pathological strategy profiles should not be solutions to the synthesis problem.
However, we will now show that the rules Coop, AG ∧ , RS · (NE, SPE) do allow the above strategy profile: Absence of dominant strategies Observe that Controller and Scheduler do not have dominant strategies. Indeed, towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a dominant Controller strategy σ . First, note that the outcome of (σ U , σ, σ S ) must be identical to the outcome of (σ U , σ C , σ S ); in fact, otherwise, this means that σ deviates from σ C at some point, in which case the outcome is losing for Controller. It follows that (σ U , σ, σ S ) is losing, while
is winning by definition, so σ cannot be dominant. Consider now strategy σ C which is identical to σ C except that it starts at phase 2 rather than starting at phase 1. One can construct a Scheduler strategy that makes σ C win, while making σ C lose: Scheduler switches toσ S in the second round as soon as σ C starts being played; and otherwise follows σ S starting at phase 2. This shows that σ cannot be dominant.
Solutions provided by AA, our novel rule Let us describe the set of admissible strategies for all players. For Controller we claim that admissible strategies are exactly those strategies σ that satisfy the following conditions for all histories h:
(C0) If φ Controller was violated at h, then behave arbitrarily in the rest of the game; otherwise: (C1) For any i ∈ {1, 2}, if r i is pending at h, then σ sets r i to false at h. (C2) For any i ∈ {1, 2}, if a i just became pending at h, then for all histories h compatible with σ , extending h, and of length |h| + k, either r i is pending at all points h ≤i with |h| ≤ i ≤ |h |, or σ sets r i to true at some history h ≤i for |h| ≤ i ≤ |h |.
Any strategy that does not satisfy these conditions is dominated. For instance, if a strategy violates (C1), say at history h, one can obtain a dominating strategy by switching at h to a strategy which respects this safety property. Similarly, if from history h, the strategy never sets r i in all possible continuations of length k while a i is pending and r i is not, one can again modify it by switching to a "better" strategy which does set r i eventually. The argument is formalized in the following lemma (detailed proofs are given in "Appendix 1").
Lemma 1 Any strategy for Controller is admissible if, and only if it satisfies (C0), (C1), and (C2) at all histories.
We now describe the admissible strategies for Scheduler. Consider the set of strategies satisfying the following conditions, at all histories h, (C3) if both requests r 1 and r 2 were made at the latest round of h, then grant q 1 , (C4) if request r 2 was made in the penultimate round of h, and either r 1 is not pending or the earliest pending request r 1 was made in the latest round, then grant q 2 , (C5) if request r 1 was made in the penultimate round of h and is pending, and r 2 is not pending, or the earliest pending request r 2 was made in the latest round, then grant q 1 . (C6) if both pending requests r 1 and r 2 were made at the penultimate round, then behave arbitrarily in the rest of the game.
Lemma 2 Any Scheduler strategy is admissible if, and only if it satisfies (C3), (C4), (C5), and (C6) at all histories.
We now show that the rule AA applies in this case: all players' objectives hold under admissible strategies, that is, assuming conditions (C0)-(C6).
Lemma 3 For all k
By the way we obtained the solutions of AA, it should be clear that the set of solutions is rectangular. In fact, we independently characterized the set of admissible strategies for Controller, and then for Scheduler, and proved that any combination of these satisfy all objectives.
Algorithm for assume-admissible synthesis
In this section, we give an algorithm to decide the assume-admissible rule and to synthesize AA-winning strategy profiles for prefix-independent objectives. Our algorithm is based on the characterization of the outcomes of admissible strategies of [2] and the algorithm of [5] that computes the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Our general algorithm is an application of these results, but we also improve the complexity analysis in the case of Büchi objectives. The details of the algorithm will be useful in Sect. 6 where we will adapt the algorithm to abstract state spaces.
Values and admissible outcomes
Let us recall the characterization of the outcomes of admissible strategy profiles given in [5] . We use the game of Fig. 2 as a running example for this section. Clearly, none of the players of this game has a winning strategy for his own objective when not taking into account the objective of the other player, but, as we will see, both players have an admissible and winning strategy against the admissible strategies of the other player, and so the AA rule applies.
The notion of value associated to the states of a game plays an important role in the characterization of admissible strategies and their outcomes [2, 5] . We fix a game G. Given a history h, and a set of strategies i for player i, we write i (h) for the set of strategies of i compatible with h, that is, the set of strategies σ i such that h is the prefix of an outcome in Out G (σ i ). We also write (h) for i∈P i (h). [2] ) Let be a rectangular set of strategy profiles. The value of history h for player i with respect to , written Val i ( , h), is given by:
Definition 1 (Value
We use the shorthand notation Val i (h) = Val i ( , h). Notice that for prefix-independent objectives, the value only depends on the last state. We may thus write
A player j decreases its own value in history h if there is a position k such that
We proved in [5] , that players do not decrease their own values when playing admissible strategies. In fact, if the current state has value 1, there is a winning strategy which stays within the winning region; if the value is 0, then although other players may force the play into states of value −1, a good strategy for player i will not do this by itself. Let us call those strategies that do not decrease the player's own value value-preserving. 
Lemma 4 [5, Lemma 1] For all games G with prefix-independent objectives, players i, and histories ρ, if last(ρ) ∈ S i and σ
We prove here that conversely, any winning outcome on which player i does not decrease its own value is compatible with an admissible strategy of player i. We will use for that three lemmas from [2] .
Lemma 5 ([2, Corollary 12], for α = 1) If is non-empty then Adm is non-empty.
the strategy that agrees with σ i on every prefix of h and with σ i for all other histories. We say that a strategy set i allows shifting, if for any 
Lemma 8 Consider game G, a player i, and outcome ρ. If ρ | φ i and player i does not decrease its own value in any prefix of ρ, then there exists a strategy profile (σ
Proof We define the strategies σ i and σ −i such that they precisely follow ρ, but if a deviation from ρ has occurred, they switch to non-dominated strategies. More precisely, if the current history is a prefix ρ ≤k of ρ, then they proceed to the following state ρ k+1 . Otherwise there is k such that h k = ρ k , h k+1 = ρ k+1 , and starting from h ≤k+1 , σ i follows a non-dominated strategy with respect to (h k+1 ). The fact that such non-dominated strategies exists follows from the existence of non-dominated strategies (Lemma 5) and the fact that this set allows shifting (Lemma 6). The outcome ρ is obviously an outcome of this profile. We now have to show that the strategy σ i is admissible. According to Lemma 7,  it is enough to show that for every history h compatible with σ i , the value for player i with respect to {σ i } × −i is greater or equal to its value with respect to .
Let h be a history compatible with σ i . We distinguish the case where h has deviated from ρ and the case where it has not.
If a deviation has occurred, then σ i follows a strategy non dominated with respect to (h ≤k+1 ) where k is the last index where h k = ρ k . By Lemma 7, the value of {σ i } × −i (h) in h is greater or equal to that of (h ≤k+1 ). Since −i (h) ⊆ −i (h ≤k+1 ), the value of h with respect to {σ i } × −i (h) is greater or equal to that with respect to (h). Note that by the definition of the value, the value of h with respect to a rectangular set is equal to that of h with respect to (h). Therefore the value of h with respect to {σ i } × is greater or equal to that with respect to .
If a deviation has not occurred then h is a prefix of ρ. The value of h with respect to is greater or equal to 0 since ρ is winning for φ i . Then:
• if the value is 0, then as there is an outcome of σ i after this history which is winning (the outcome ρ), the value of σ i is at least 0;
• if the value is 1, then we can show that from history h, σ i plays a winning strategy: if we stay along ρ, the outcome is winning; if we deviate in a state controlled by player i then since player i does not decrease its own value, the next state has value 1 and σ i reverts to a winning strategy; otherwise we deviate in a state s of the adversaries, because there is a winning strategy from states of value 1, there is also a winning strategies from all successors of s, so the outcome goes to a state of value 1 and σ i reverts to a winning strategy.
Therefore the property is satisfied by σ i and it is admissible.
We now introduce some notations to take into account the two previous lemmas in our characterization. We restrict ourselves here to prefix-independent objectives. For player i, let us define the sets V i,x = {s | Val i (s) = x} for x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, which partition S. We define the set of value-preserving edges for player i as
Observe that value-preserving strategies for player i are exactly those respecting E i .
Example 3
In our running example of Fig. 2 , it should be clear that any strategy that chooses a transition that goes to s 3 is not admissible nor for player 1 neither for player 2. By making such a choice, both players are condemned to lose for their own objectives while other choices would leave a chance to win. In fact, the choice of going to s 3 would decrease their own values. So, we can already conclude that player 2 always chooses s 2 → s 1 , which is his only admissible strategy.
However, not all value-preserving strategies are admissible: e.g. for Büchi objectives, staying inside the winning region (that is, states with value 1) does not imply the objective. Moreover, in states of value 0, admissible strategies must visit states where other players can "help" satisfy the objective. Formally, help states for player i are other players' states with value 0 and at least two different successors of value 0 or 1. Let us define
The following lemma, adapted from [5] , characterizes the outcomes of admissible strategies. We denote by G(E i ) the set of outcomes that respect
Lemma 9 For all games G, and players i, we have
Note that a more general construction A n i was given in [5] but we only need the case n = 1 here.
We now analyze further the language of A 1 i . The edges are those of G except for edges outside of E i (these edges are noted T in [5] ), so the set of outcomes in A 1 i corresponds to Out G ∩ G(E i ). Now an outcome of A 1 i is accepted if, and only if one the following condition is satisfied, writing VR(ρ) for the sequence (Val(ρ i )) i∈N :
Any outcome of Out G ∩ G(E i ) reaching some state of value −1 is necessarily losing; thus all successors also have value −1. Similarly, because we removed edges where player i decreases its own value, once the outcomes reaches a state of value 1, it never gets out of these states. Therefore outcomes of Out G ∩ G(E i ) have one of the three forms:
Let ρ be an outcome that is accepted by A 1 i , it satisfies G(E i ) and: 
This shows that 1 ∩ Out G = A 1 i ∩ Out G and by [5, Lemma 6] , this equals Out(Adm i , −i ).
In our running example of Fig. 2 , a strategy of player 1 which, after some point, always chooses s 1 → s 1 is dominated by strategies that choose infinitely often s 1 → s 2 . This is a corollary of the lemma above. Indeed, while all those strategies only visit states with value 0 (and so do not decrease the value for player 1), the strategy that always chooses s 1 → s 1 has an outcome which is losing for player 1 while the other strategies are compatible with outcomes that are winning for player 1. So, all outcomes of admissible strategies for player 1 that always visit states with values 0, also visits s 2 infinitely often. Using the fact that strategies are value-preserving and the last observation, we can now conclude that both players have (admissible) winning strategies against the admissible strategies of the other players. For instance when player 1 always chooses to play s 1 → s 2 , he wins against the admissible strategies of player 2.
Algorithm for Müller objectives
For player i, let us define the objective
which describes the outcomes of admissible strategies of player i, which satisfy objective φ i under the hypothesis that they are compatible with other players' admissible strategies. In fact, it follows from [5] that i captures the outcomes of AA-winning strategies for player i.
Lemma 10 A player i strategy is AA-winning iff it is winning for objective i .
Proof It is shown in [5, Proposition 5 ] that a strategy of player i is a strategy of n i which is winning against all strategies of n −i if, and only if, it is winning for objective n i (where n is the set of strategies that remain after n steps of elimination, and 1 i coincides with i ). The results immediately follows from the case n = 1.
Thus, solving the AA rule is reduced to solving, for each player i, a game with objective i . We now give the details of an algorithm with optimal complexity to solve games with these objectives. The algorithm uses procedures from [5] , originally developed to compute the outcomes that survive the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. More precisely, the elimination procedure of [5] first computes the outcomes of admissible strategies; from this it deduces the strategies that are not dominated when all players are restricted to admissible strategies, and their possible outcomes; and this is repeated until the set of outcomes stabilizes. In the end, one obtains the set of the outcomes that are the outcomes of strategy profiles that have survived this iterative elimination. In the rest of this section, we re-visit roughly the first iteration of the above procedure, and explicitly give algorithms to actually synthesize strategies that are winning against admissible strategies.
Objective i is not prefix-independent since i has a safety part, thus it cannot be directly expressed as a Müller condition. Since considering prefix-independent objectives simplifies the presentation and the proofs, we are going to encode the information whether G(E i ), or G(∪ j =i E j ) has been violated in the state space.
Let us decompose
is a safety condition and
is prefix-independent, and can be expressed by a Müller condition described by a circuit of polynomial size. We now describe the encoding. For each player i, we define game G i by taking the product of G with { , 0, ⊥}; that is, the states are S × { , 0, ⊥}, and the initial state (s init , 0). The transitions are defined as for G for the first component; while from state (s, 0), any action a outside E i leads to (δ(s, a) , ⊥), and any action a outside E j , for some j = i, leads to (δ(s, a) , ). The second component is absorbing at ⊥, . We define
where M i is the set of outcomes of G i whose projections to G are in M i , and similarly for φ i .
We will now establish the equivalence of G and G i for objectives i and i respectively. Let us first formalize the correspondence between G and G i . We define relation ∼ ⊆ S × S : for all (s, x) ∈ S × {⊥, 0, }, s ∼ (s, x). We extend this to outcomes by ρ ∼ ρ iff for all i ∈ N, ρ i ∼ ρ i . The next lemma shows that the relation is a bijection between Out G and Out G i .
Lemma 11
For any ρ ∈ Out G there is a unique ρ ∈ Out G i such that ρ ∼ ρ .
Proof For any outcome ρ ∈ Out G i , let us write π(ρ) the projection to Out G defined by mapping each vertex (s, x) to s.
Assume towards a contradiction that we have ρ and ρ such that ρ = π(ρ ) = π(ρ ). Let k be the last state such that they coincide: ρ k = ρ k and ρ k+1 = ρ k+1 . Since π(ρ ) = π(ρ ) we have that they differ only by the second component. We can assume without loss of generality that there are actions a and b such that (ρ k , a) ∈ E j (where player j controls
. This means that there are actions a and b such that (s, a) ∈ E j (where player j controls
belongs to E j which contradicts our assumptions and ends the proof.
We thus write π for the bijection which, to ρ ∈ Out G i associates ρ ∈ Out G with ρ ∼ ρ . We extend π as a mapping from strategies of G i to strategies of G by π( π(σ i )) .
Lemma 12
⇒ Let σ i be a winning strategy for i in G. We consider the strategy σ i defined by σ i (h ) = σ i (π(h )) and will show that it is winning for i . Let ρ be an outcome of σ i . We have that π(ρ ) is an outcome of σ i . Since σ i is winning for i , π(ρ ) belongs to i .
•
, then by construction of δ the play ρ reaches a state of S × { } and, from there, only states of S × { } are visited. The condition GF(S × { }) ∧ M i is met by ρ and therefore ρ is winning for i .
This shows that the strategy σ i is winning for i in G i . ⇐ Let σ i be a winning strategy for i in G i , we show that π(σ i ) is winning for i in G. Let ρ be an outcome of π(σ i ). We have that π −1 (ρ) is an outcome of σ i . Since σ i is winning for i , π −1 (ρ) belongs to i . We have that π −1 (ρ) | GF(S × {0, }) and by construction of δ this ensures that all edges that are taken belong to E i and thus π −1 (ρ) satisfies the condition G(E i ).
• If π −1 (ρ) | GF(S × { }) ∧ M i then by construction of δ , an edge outside of E j for some j = i is taken. This ensures condition F(¬E j ) and therefore ρ belongs to i .
This shows that the strategy π(σ i ) is winning for i in G.
This characterization yields a PSPACE algorithm for checking whether a given player has a AA-winning strategy. In fact, when objectives φ i are given as Müller conditions (described by circuits), the value sets
Computation of AA-winning Strategy Profiles
We just proved the PSPACE-completeness of the decision problem; here, we show how to actually compute AA-winning strategies. Thanks to Lemma 12, we obtain an algorithm to compute AA-winning strategies by looking for winning strategies in G i and projecting them: Proof If AA has a solution, then by Lemma 12, there is a winning strategy for i in G i . This Muller game has polynomial size, hence we can compute a winning strategy σ i in exponential time (for instance in [29] the authors show that we can compute such a winning strategy via a safety game of size |S|! 3 ). By Lemma 12, the projection π(σ i ) is an AA-winning strategy. Doing this for each player we obtain a strategy profile solution of AA.
Algorithm for Büchi objectives
In this section, we show that the complexity of the problem can be substantially reduced if players' objective are described by Büchi conditions. In fact, we give a polynomial-time algorithm in this case by showing that i is expressible by a parity condition with only four colors.
Theorem 3
The existence of an AA-winning strategy profile can be decided in polynomial time for Büchi objectives.
The following of this section is devoted to proving this theorem. In the case of Büchi objectives, let us write φ i = GF(B i ) the objective of player i. We can then rewrite the objective
In game G, an outcome that satisfies G(E i ) will either visit only V i,1 after some point, or only V i,−1 after some point, or only V i,0 (see the proof of Lemma 9 for details). In order to simplify the notations, and since the propositions 
Hence:
Therefore M i coincide with the Büchi condition GF(C i ) where
We write C i for the states of G i whose projection is in C i . We will also write B i for the states B i × {⊥, 0, } of the game G i .
We define
Notice that i is obtained from i by replacing each M j by GF(C j ). From the observations above, it follows that GF(S × {0}) ∧ GF(C i ) is equivalent to GF(S × {0}) ∧ M i ; however, this is not the case a priori for players j = i. Nevertheless, we prove in the following lemma that winning for objective i in G is equivalent to winning for the objective i in G for Player i. 
We then prove the equivalence. ⇒ Let σ i be a winning strategy for i in G. We consider the strategy σ i defined by
) and will show that it is winning for i . Let ρ be an outcome of σ i . We have that π(ρ ) is an outcome of σ i . Since σ i is winning for i , π(ρ ) belongs to i .
. By construction of δ the play ρ reaches a state of S × { } and, from there, only states of S × { } are visited. The condition GF(S × { }) ∧ M i is met by ρ . Therefore ρ satisfies GF(S × { }) ∧ GF(C i ). It is thus winning for i .
Therefore GF(C i ) is also met. Since having GF(S×{0}) means that no edge outside of E j is seen for any player j, under the assumption GF(S×{0}), j =i M j is equivalent
. It is thus winning for i .
then by construction of δ , an edge outside of E j for some j = i is taken. This ensures condition F(¬E j ) and therefore ρ belongs to i .
Since ρ satisfies condition G(E i ), it also satisfies M i (by the main property of C i ). And since having GF(S × {0}) means that no edge outside of E j is seen for any player j, under the assumption GF(S×{0}), j =i M j is equivalent to j =i GF(C j ).
Since in game G i , states of S × and S × ⊥ are absorbing (no play can get out of those components) we write an objective equivalent to i in terms of runs of G i it defines, which is:
We define a (small) deterministic parity automaton A which recognizes this language. Its state space is ({s, t, u, v} × ({ j | j ∈ P\{i }} ∪ { f })). Intuitively the first component monitors which of C i and B i occurs infinitely often, and the second component monitors whether we satisfy each of the conditions GF(C j ). The transition relation is a product of transitions for the two components: s We show that a play of G i satisfies i if, and only if, it is a word accepted by A. Let ρ be a play of G i which satisfies i . Either it ends in the S × component or the S × 0 component: • If ρ ends in the component then the state of color 3 will not be visited infinitely often, because we need to be in the S × 0 part of the game to progress on the second component of the automaton. As ρ visits infinitely often C i , the corresponding outcome in A will visit infinitely often u, and therefore the maximal color that appears infinitely often is either 2 or 4.
• Otherwise ρ ends in the 0 component. Since ρ satisfies i , it visits C i infinitely often and either there is a C j for j = i that is not visited infinitely often, or ρ visits infinitely often B i .
-If there is a C j for j = i that is not visited infinitely often, then the second component of A will get stuck at some point and its state f which is neccessary for color 3, will not be visited infinitely often. As ρ visits infinitely often C i , the corresponding outcome in A will visit infinitely often u, and therefore the maximal color that appears infinitely often is either 2 or 4. -Otherwise ρ visits infinitely often B i . Since we also visit C i infinitely often, the outcome of A corresponding to ρ will reach infinitely often a state (v, * ) and therefore the maximal color occurring infinitely often is 4.
This proves that the word is accepted by A. Now let ρ be a play of G i such that the corresponding word is accepted by A. If it is accepted then either the color 4 is seen infinitely often or the color 2 is and the color 3 is not:
• If the color 4 is visited infinitely often then this means t is reached infinitely often in the first component, and because of the structure of A, u also is, which means both C i × {0} and B i occurs infinitely often. This implies that the outcome ρ belongs to i . • Otherwise the color 2 is visited infinitely often and 3 is not. The states ( * , ) are therefore not visited infinitely often (otherwise the maximal color would be 3 or 4). We deduce from that and the structure of A that some C j for j = i is not visited infinitely often. This means j =i GF(C j ) is not true for ρ. Since the color 2 is seen infinitely often, this means u, * is seen infinitely often and therefore B i × {0, }. This ensures ρ belongs to i . This proves that a play of G i satisfy i if, and only if, it is a word accepted by A.
Then solving the game G i with objective i is the same as solving it with objective given by A. This can be done by solving the parity game obtained by the product of G i with the automaton A. The obtained game is of polynomial size and the number of priorities is 4, such games can be solved in polynomial time (see for instance [25, 31] ) and therefore we can decide our problem in polynomial time.
Computation of AA-winning strategies
Theorem 4 Given a game G with Büchi objectives, if AA has a solution, then an AA-winning strategy profile can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof If AA has a solution, then by Lemma 13, there is a winning strategy for i in G i . This parity game has polynomial size and only 4 priorities. We can compute a winning strategy σ i in polynomial time for this kind of games (for instance in [1] the authors compute the most permissive strategy in time O(n d/2+1 ) where n is the size of the game and d the number of priorities). By Lemma 13, the projection π(σ i ) is an AA-winning strategy. Doing this for each player we obtain a strategy profile solution of AA.
Reduction to Strategy Logic
As we already mentioned it in the introduction, we can reduce the existence of a winning AA-profile to the model-checking problem of a strategy logic formula [10, 27] . The strategy logic formula is obtained directly from the definition of winning AA-profiles using quantification over strategies and LTL formulas to express the objectives of each player. Remember that the objectives of the players are either succinct Muller objectives defined by circuits, or Büchi objectives defined sets of accepting states, one per player.
To study the complexity of the algorithm that we get from such a reduction, we note that the formula of strategy logic that are construct are of constant alternation depth as strategy quantifiers are used exactly as in the definition of winning AA-profiles and so the number of alternation does not depend on the instance of the problem that is considered. On the contrary, the size of the formula which is generated is bounded:
• exponentially in the size of the game graph for succinct Muller games (as -to the best of our knowledge -there does not exist succinct ways to code succinct Muller objectives into LTL objectives), • bounded polynomially in the size of the game graph times the number of players (as on the contrary Büchi objectives can be coded succinctly in LTL).
Now, if we apply theorem 3 of [10]
, we get a 2ExpTime algorithm for succinct Muller games and a ExpTime algorithm for Büchi games.
Our results provide better complexities as we provide a PSpace algorithm for succinct Muller games and a PTime algorithm for Büchi games Ñ matching the known lower bounds for the respective problems. Also, we could add that for reachability and safety objectives, easy extension of our solution provides polynomial time algorithms when the number of players is fixed (this is a consequence of Theorem 4 of [5] ). Again, those results are out of reach of a direct reduction to strategy logic.
Abstraction framework
We present abstraction techniques to compute assume-admissible strategy profiles following the abstract interpretation framework [13] ; see [21] for games. Abstraction is a crucial feature for scalability in practice, and we show here that the AA rule is amenable to abstraction techniques. The problem is not directly reducible to computing AA-winning strategies in abstract games obtained as e.g. in [15] ; in fact, the set of admissible strategies of an abstract game is incomparable with those of the concrete game in general; we give this evidence in "Appendix 2". Thus, we are going to revisit the assume-admissible synthesis algorithm presented in the previous section, and give an effective sufficient criterion that can be decided solely on the abstract state space.
Overview Informally, to compute an AA-winning strategy for player k, we construct an abstract game A k with objective k s.t. winning strategies of player k in A k map to AAwinning strategies in G. To define A k , we re-visit the steps of the algorithm of Sect. 5 by defining approximations computed on the abstract state space. More precisely, we show how to compute under-and over-approximations of the sets V x,k , namely V x,k and V x,k , using fixpoint computations on the abstract state space only. We then use these sets to define approximations of the value preserving edges (E k and E k ) and those of the help states (H k and H k ). These are then combined to define objective k s.t. if player k wins the abstract game for k , then he wins the original game for k , and thus has an AA-winning strategy.
Abstract games
Consider G = A, (φ i ) i∈P with A = P, (S i ) i∈P , s init , (Act i ) i∈P , δ where each φ i is a Müller objective given by a family of sets of states (F i ) i∈P . Let S a = i∈P S a i denote a finite set, namely the abstract state space. A concretization function γ : S a → 2 S is a function such that:
• the abstract states partitions the state space:
• it is compatible with players' states: for all players i and s a ∈ S a i , γ (s a ) ⊆ S i . We define the corresponding abstraction function α : S → S a where α(s) is the unique state s a s.t. s ∈ γ (s a ). We also extend α, γ naturally to sets of states; and to histories, by replacing each element of the sequence by its image.
The pair of abstraction and concretization functions (α, γ ) actually defines a Galois connection:
Lemma 14 The pair (α, γ ) is a Galois connection, that is, for all S ⊆ S and T ⊆ S a , we have that α(S) ⊆ T if, and only if, S ⊆ γ (T ).
Proof ⇒ Let s ∈ S. Since γ defines a partition of S, there exists t ∈ S a such that s ∈ γ (t).
By definition of α, α(s) = t. Assuming α(S) ⊆ T , we have that t ∈ T . As s ∈ γ (t), we have s ∈ γ (T ). ⇐ If s a ∈ α(S), then there is s ∈ S such that s a = α(s). Assuming S ⊆ γ (T ), there is t ∈ T such that s = γ (t). By definition of α, we have that α(s)
We further assume that γ is compatible with all objectives F i in the sense that the abstraction of a set S is sufficient to determine whether S ∈ F i : for all i ∈ P, for all S, S ⊆ S with α(S) = α(S ), we have S ∈ F i ⇔ S ∈ F i . If the objective φ i is given by a circuit, then the circuit for the corresponding abstract objective φ a i is obtained by replacing each input on state s by α(s). We thus have ρ ∈ φ i if, and only if, α(ρ) ∈ φ a i . The abstract transition relation a induced by γ is defined by:
We write post (s a , a)={t a ∈ S a | (s a , a, t a )}, and post (s a , Act)=∪ a∈Act post (s a , a).
For each coalition C ⊆ P, we define a game in which players C play together against coalition −C; and the former resolves non-determinism in a . Intuitively, the winning region for C in this abstract game will be an over-approximation of the winning region for C in the original game. Given C, the abstract arena
, where
and Act C = i∈C Act i ∪ S a and Act −C = i∈−C Act i . The relation δ a,C is given by: if s a ∈ S a , then δ a, C (s a , a) = (s a , a). If (s a , a) ∈ S a × Act and t a ∈ S a satisfies  (s a , a, t a ) ∈ a then δ a,C ((s a , a) , t a ) = t a ; while for (s a , a, t a ) / ∈ a , the play leads to an arbitrarily chosen state u a with (s a , a, u a ) . Thus, from states (s a , a) , coalition C chooses a successor t a which satisfies a .
We extend γ to histories of A C by first removing states of (S a i × Act i ); and extend α by inserting these intermediate states. Given a strategy σ of player k in A C , we define its concretization as the strategy γ (σ ) of G that, at any history h of G, plays γ (σ )(h) = σ (α(h)). We write Win D (A C , φ a  k ) for the states of S a from which the coalition D has a winning strategy in A C for objective φ a k , with D ∈ {C, −C}. Informally, it is easier for coalition C to achieve an objective in
Lemma 15 If the coalition C has a winning strategy for objective φ k in G from s then it has a winning strategy for φ a k in A C from α(s).
Proof Assume σ C is a winning profile of coalition C, for objective φ k in G. We define by induction a winning strategy σ a C in G a,k,C . We assume that σ a C has been defined in a manner such that for each finite outcome h a of σ a C shorter than some bound m, there is some h ∈ γ (h a ) such that h is a finite outcome of σ C . The idea is then to define σ a C to resolve the determinism in a way which simulates the behavior from h. a) ). With this definition, our induction hypothesis will be respected for histories containing one more step, and therefore this holds for all histories. Let now ρ a be an outcome σ a C . By the way we defined this strategy there is an outcome ρ outcome of σ C such that ρ ∈ γ (ρ a ). As σ C is winning, ρ satisfies the Muller condition φ k and since γ is compatible with players' objectives, ρ a satisfies φ a k . This shows that C has a winning strategy in A C for φ a k .
Value-preserving strategies
We now use the abstract games defined above to define under-and over-approximations for value-preserving strategies for a given player. We start by computing approximations V k,x and V k,x of the sets V k,x , and then use these to obtain approximations of the value-preserving edges E k (denoted E k and E k ). At the end of this subsection, we show that these allow us to obtain under-and over-approximations of the set γ (E k ) of value-preserving strategies. Fix a game G, and a player k. Let us define the controllable predecessors for player k as
We let
The last definition uses the ν X. f (X ) operator which is the greatest fixpoint of f . These sets define approximations of the sets V k,x . Informally, this follows from the fact that to define e.g. V k,1 , we use the game A {k} , where player k resolves itself the non-determinism, and thus has more power than in G. In contrast, for V k,1 , we solve A P\{k} where the adversary resolves non-determinism. We state these properties formally:
Lemma 16 For all players k and x
Proof V k,1 This is a direct consequence of Lemma 15.
If s ∈ V k,−1 then the coalition P has no winning strategy in G. By determinacy, the empty coalition has a strategy to ensure ¬φ k . Therefore by Lemma 15, the coalition ∅ has a strategy in A P from α(s) that ensures ¬φ k . Therefore s ∈ γ (V k,−1 ). We thus have ∪ x γ (V k,x ) = S (as ∪ x V k,x = S) but this is not the case for V k,x ; so let us define V = ∪ j∈{−1,0,1} V k, j . We now define approximations of E k based on the above sets.
By Lemma 15, α(s) belongs to both sides of the intersection, thus α(s)
Intuitively, E k is an over-approximation of E k , and E k under-approximates E k when restricted to states in V (notice that E k contains all actions from states outside V ). In fact, our under-approximation will be valid only inside V ; but we will require the initial state to be in this set, and make sure the play stays within V . We show that sets E k and E k provide approximations of value-preserving strategies.
We show that when playing according to E k , player k ensures staying in V . This is proven in the following.
Let us write
Lemma 17
For all games G, and players k, (δ(s, a)) ⊆ {t a | (s a , a, t a )}. Therefore α(δ(s, a) , a) ∈ E k , (s a , a, t a ) implies t a ∈ V .
If s a ∈ S a k \V , then (s a , a) ∈ E k for all a ∈ Act k by definition. Let us now assume s a ∈ V .
• If s a ∈ V k,−1 , then By definition of V k,−1 , we have that for all actions a, and all states t a , if a (s a , a, t a ) then t a ∈ V k,−1 . Thus (s a , a) ∈ E k , and t a ∈ V k,−1 for any such t a , so
Thus for any such a, (s a , a) ∈ E k , and any t a , (s a , a, t a ) means t a ∈ V k,0 .
Recall that E k does not constrain the actions outside the set V ; thus strategies in Strat k (E k ) can actually choose dominated actions outside V . To prove that Strat k (E k ) is an underapproximation of Strat k (E k ) when started in V , we need to formalize the fact that admissible strategies may choose arbitrary actions at states that are not reachable by any outcome. Intuitively, such strategies cannot be dominated since the dominated behavior is never observed.
For any strategy σ , let Reach(G, σ ) denote the set of states reachable from s init by runs compatible with σ . We show that if one arbitrarily modifies an admissible strategy outside the set Reach(G, σ ), the resulting strategy is still admissible.
Lemma 18 Let σ be a strategy in Adm i (G) and σ a strategy in i (G). If for all histories h such that
, then σ would also be dominated, which is a contradiction.
We now show that the sets γ (
Lemma 19 For all games G, and players k,
are non-empty follows from Lemma 17 too, since for any state s a there is a ∈ Act k with (s a , a) ∈ E k .
We prove that Reach(A P\{k} , σ ) ⊆ V for all σ ∈ Strat k (E k ). We already know, by Lemma 17 , that for all s a ∈ V , if (s a , a) ∈ E k then all successors t a with (s a , a, t a ) satisfies t a ∈ V . We are going to show that for all s a ∈ V ∩ S a j with j = k, for all a ∈ Act j , a (s a , a, t a ) 
The situation is similar if If s a ∈ V k,0 , then, by the definition of the outer fixpoint, for all a ∈ Act j , a (s a , a, t a ) implies that t a ∈ V .
Thus Lemma 18 , and by the fact that γ (E k ) ⊆ E k , all strategies in γ (Strat k (E k )) are value preserving, which is to say, belong to Strat k (E k ).
Help states
We now define approximations of the help states H k , where we write (s a , Act, t a ) to mean ∃a ∈ Act, (s a , a, t a ) .
Lemma 20 For all players k, γ (H
Proof Let s a ∈ H k , and let a, b ∈ Act two witnessing actions. For all δ(s, a) = δ(s, b) . If we write t a = α (δ(s, a) ) and u a = α (δ(s, b) and (s a , a, t a ), and (s a , b, u a ) ; thus α(s) ∈ H k . It follows that H k ⊆ γ (H k ).
Abstract synthesis of AA-winning strategies
We now describe the computation of AA-winning strategies in abstract games. Consider game G and assume sets E i , E i are computed for all players i. Roughly, to compute a strategy for player k, we will constrain him to play only edges from E k , while other players j will play in E j . By Lemma 19, any strategy of player k maps to value-preserving strategies in the original game, and all value-preserving strategies for other players are still present. We now formalize this idea, incorporating the help states in the abstraction.
We fix a player k. We construct an abstract game in which winning for player k implies that player k has an effective AA-winning strategy in G. We define
where S a = S a × {⊥, 0, }; thus we modify A P\{k} by taking the product of the state space with { , 0, ⊥}. Intuitively, as in Sect. 5, initially the second component is 0, meaning that no player has violated the value-preserving edges. The component becomes ⊥ whenever player k plays an action outside of E k ; and if another player j plays outside E j (for j ∈ P\{i }). We extend γ to A k by γ ((s a , x) ) = γ (s a ) × {x}, and extend it to histories of A k by first removing the intermediate states S a × Act. We thus see A k as an abstraction of A of Sect. 5.
We define the following approximations of the objectives M k and k in A k .
Similarly, by Lemma 20, we 
The following lemma implies our main result, stated next as a theorem.
Lemma 22
Let k ∈ P be a player and σ k a strategy of player k. If s a init ∈ V , and σ k is winning for objective k 
Let σ k be a winning strategy in A k for k . We will show that
is an outcome of A k compatible with σ k . Since σ k is a winning strategy, α(ρ) ∈ M k , and by Lemma 21 ρ ∈ M k .
We now show that ρ ∈ GF(S × {0, }). By assumption, we have A k , σ k | GF(S a × {0, }), which means that for all histories h a of A k compatible with σ k , (last(h a ), σ (h a ) ) ∈ E k (otherwise the transition relation of A k would lead to a ⊥ state). Moreover, since s a init ∈ V , it follows from Lemma 19 that
Because of the structure of G k this means that ρ either visits states of S × {0} or states of S × { } infinitely often:
it follows, by Lemma 21 and the compatibility of the abstraction with players' objectives,
Thus any outcome ρ of γ (σ k ) belongs to k which shows it is winning.
Theorem 5
For all games G, and players k, if s init ∈ V , and player k has a winning strategy in A k for objective k , then he has a winning strategy in G k for k ; and thus a AA-winning strategy in G.
Theorem 5 allows one to find AA-winning strategies using abstractions. In fact, for each player k, one can define an abstraction, construct and solve the game A k for objective k . If this succeeds for each player k, the obtained strategies yield an AA-winning strategy profile in G.
Algorithm for assume-guarantee synthesis
The assume-guarantee-∧ rule was studied in [7] for particular games with three players. However, the given proofs are based on secure equilibria which do not actually capture assume-guarantee synthesis, so the correctness of the algorithm of [7] is not clear. We first give an example that illustrates the non-correspondance of secure equilibria and assumeguarantee synthes, and then give an alternative algorithm for deciding assume-guarantee-∧ for multiplayer games, and prove its correctness.
We recall that a secure equilibrium [7] is a strategy profile σ P such that for any player i, and
Example 4 We consider a game with three players: player 1 controls the valuation of x 1 ; player 2 the valuation of x 2 , and player 3 is a scheduler which gives turn to either player 1 or player 2 at each step. player 3 is assumed to be fair in the sense that at every point in the game each player eventually gets to play. Consider the following objective for player 1: Fx 2 ) . The objective for player 2 is trivial (always true). We consider strategy σ 3 of player 3 that alternates between each player. Strategy σ 1 of player 1 puts x 1 to true once x 2 has been put to true at least once. Strategy σ 2 of player 2 never puts x 2 to true. These strategies form a secure equilibrium which satisfies each objective since we cannot improve the outcome with respect to < i by changing only the strategy of player i. However it is not an assume-guarantee solution: if we consider another scheduler strategy σ 3 which gives twice the turn to player 2, and a strategy σ 2 which will put x 2 to true in the first turn, then Out(σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) | φ 1 . The same is in fact true for any strategy σ 1 of player 1 so there is no assume-guarantee synthesis solution, which contradicts [7, Thm. 4] .
We now give an algorithm for assume-guarantee synthesis. For any game G, and state s, we denote by G s the game obtained by making s the initial state. Assuming that each player i has an objective φ i which is prefix independent, let us define
The following lemma gives a decidable characterization of assume-guarantee synthesis: Proof ⇒ Let σ P be a solution of AG ∧ . Let ρ be its outcome. We have that ρ | i∈P φ i by hypothesis of AG ∧ . Let i be a player, we show that ρ only visits states of W i . This is because σ i is winning for j∈P\{i} φ j ⇒ φ i . For all k, ρ ≤k is a finite outcome of σ i , and the strategy played by σ i after this history is winning for j∈P\{i} φ j ⇒ φ i , which means that ρ k belongs to W i . Hence ρ satisfies the desired conditions. ⇐ If there is such an outcome ρ, we define the strategy profile σ P to follow this outcome if no deviation has occurred and otherwise each player i plays a strategy which is winning for j∈P\{i} φ j ⇒ φ i if possible. We show that such a strategy profile satisfies the assumption of assume-guarantee. Obviously σ P | i∈P φ i . Let ρ be an outcome of σ i and k the first index such that ρ k = ρ k . The state ρ k−1 = ρ k−1 is not controlled by player i, because σ i follows ρ. As ρ k−1 is in W i and not controlled by player i, this means that ρ k ∈ W i . Therefore σ i plays a winning strategy from ρ k for the objective j∈P\{i} φ j ⇒ φ i ; thus ρ satisfies this objective. Hence σ P is a solution of AG ∧ .
We deduce a polynomial-space algorithm for the AG ∧ rule with Muller objectives: Proof The algorithms proceed by computing the set W i for each player i with an algorithm that computes winning regions and then checks whether there is an outcome in the intersection i∈P W i which satisfies i∈P φ i . This algorithm is correct thanks to Lemma 23. This is in PSPACE because the objective j∈P\{i} φ j ⇒ φ i can be expressed by a Muller condition encoded by a circuit [23] of polynomial size. We can decide in polynomial space if a given state is winning for a Muller condition given by a circuit. Thus, the set i∈P W i can be computed in polynomial space; let us denote by G the game restricted to this set. The algorithm then consists in finding an outcome in G satisfying i∈P φ i ; that is, finding an outcome satisfying a Muller condition, which can be done in polynomial space.
Comparison of synthesis rules
In this section, we compare the synthesis rules to understand which ones yield solutions more often, and to assess their robustness. Some relations are easy to establish; for instance, rules to Coop means that none of the rules in the box implies Coop. References to lemmas that prove the relations are given on each arrow. Missing arrows are either trivial relations or they Note that an arrow does not imply an inclusion between the witnessing strategy profiles.
The following theorem states the correctness of our diagram.
Theorem 7
The implication relations of Fig. 5 hold.
We will present the proof of each comparison of the diagram in Fig. 5 .
Remark 1 We have RS
subgame perfect equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in the definition of the rules RS, the conditions for RS ∀ are stronger than for
Proof Win ⇒ AA This holds because winning strategies are always admissible [2] , therefore a profile witness of Win satisfies condition 1 and 2 of the definition of assume-admissible. AA ⇒ Coop This holds by Theorem 1.
Coop ⇒ RS ∃ (SPE) Note that in order for RS to make sense we must have sys ∈ P.
Assume Coop has a solution and let σ P be a profile of strategy such that for all player i,
We define a strategy profile σ i , that follows the path ρ = Out G (σ i ) when possible (that is: if h is a prefix of ρ then play act |h| (ρ)) and if not follows a subgame perfect equilibrium: that is, we select for each state s a subgame perfect equilibrium σ s P , there always exist one for Borel games (so in particular for Muller games) [32, Theorem 3.15] ; then if h is not a prefix of ρ, let j be the last index such that h ≤ j = ρ ≤ j and we define σ P (h) = σ
Let h be a history. If h is a prefix of ρ then the objective of each player is satisfied by following σ i • h so none of them can gain by changing its strategy, therefore it is a Nash equilibrium from last(h). If h is not a prefix of ρ then by definition of σ i , players follow a subgame-perfect equilibrium since h deviated from ρ, so in particular σ i • h is a Nash equilibrium from last(h). Moreover the objective of the system is satisfied. Therefore σ P is a solution to RS(SPE).
Win ⇒ AG ∨ Let σ P such that for each player i, σ i is winning for φ i . 
) and outside of these histories follows a subgame perfect equilibria: there always exist one for Borel games (so in particular for Muller games) [32, Theorem 3.15] . By definition of σ P , the outcome Out G (σ P ) is the same than Out G (σ P ). Because σ P is a witness for RS ∀ (Dom), this outcome is winning for player 1.
It remains to show that σ −1 is a subgame perfect equilibria. Let h be a history, i be a player different from player 1, and σ i be a strategy for player i. We show that from h player i does not improve by switching from σ i to another strategy σ i , which will show that σ P • h is a Nash equilibrium from h.
If h is compatible with σ i then σ i coincide with σ i from this history, so
This means that i does not improve by switching from σ i to σ i .
If h is not compatible with σ i , then σ i plays according to a subgame-perfect equilibria since the first deviation. In particular, this strategy is a Nash equilibrium from h.
This shows that σ −1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium and has σ P | φ 1 , this is a witness for RS ∃ (SPE).
Consider the example given in Fig. 6 . The strategy r for player 2 is dominant and any strategy of player 3 is dominant. The outcome of these strategies always go to the bottom state where φ sys is satisfied. Therefore there is a solution to
However, we show that there is no solution to RS ∀ (NE).
Consider the strategy profile (·, l, b), this is a Nash equilibrium (even a subgame Nash equilibrium) since no player can improve his/her strategy. Note that player 1 is losing for that profile, hence no strategy of player 1 can ensure that it will win for all Nash equilibria.
In the example of Sect. 4, we saw that more strategy profiles satisfied the assume-guarantee condition compared to assume-admissibility, including undesirable strategy profiles. We show that the rule AG ∧ is indeed more often satisfied than AA; while the rules AG ∨ , and AA are incomparable. Fig. 7 . In this example, we have Adm 1 = 1 . Therefore player 2 has no winning strategy against all admissible strategies of Adm 2 (in particular the strategy of player 1 that plays r , makes player 2 lose). So AA fails. However, we do have AG ∧ by the profile σ 1 :
This profile also satisfies AG ∨ which is equivalent to AG ∧ for two player games.
AA AG ∧ Consider the example of Fig. 8 . The profile where player 1 and player 2 plays to the right is assume-admissible. However there is no solution to assume-guarantee synthesis: if player 1 and player 2 change their strategies to go to the state labeled φ 1 , φ 2 , then the condition G, σ 3 | (φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ) ⇒ φ 3 is not satisfied. AA AG ∨ We will provide a counter-example to show our claim. Note that we need strictly more than two players since otherwise AG ∨ is equivalent to AG ∧ , and we have just shown that AA implies AG ∧ .
Consider the game with three players in Fig. 9 . Define the following objectives:
where φ i is player i's objective. These are actually reachability objectives since the game ends in absorbing states. Now, action b is dominated at states s 2 and s 3 for player 2. Thus player 1 has a AAwinning strategy which consists in taking a at s 1 . Player 2 has a winning strategy in the game (taking a at both states). Player 3 has a AA-winning strategy too since actions b are eliminated for player 2. Therefore, there is an AA-winning strategy profile which ends in s 4 .
On the other hand, there is no AG ∨ profile. In fact, player 1 has no winning strategy to ensure φ 2 ∨ φ 3 ⇒ φ 1 , which is equivalent to φ 1 since φ 3 = true.
Lemma 27
For two player games, AA ⇒ AG ∧ .
Proof Assume G is a two player game and consider strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) witness of AA. Note that if player j decreases his own value at position k then its value for h ≤k+1 will be smaller or equal to 0 which means player j has no winning strategy from this history. By determinacy of turn-based zero-sum games, player 3− j has a winning strategy for ¬φ j . Therefore we can adjust the strategies (σ 1 , σ 2 ) such that if there is a player j that decreases his own value, the other player will make it lose. We write (σ 1 , σ 2 ) the strategies thus defined and we will show that they form a solution of Assume-Guarantee.
Let ρ be the outcome of the strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ). We can show that ρ is also the outcome of (σ 1 , σ 2 ). First we recall that an admissible strategy does not decrease his own value (Lemma 4). Therefore each σ i is identical to σ i on the run ρ. By Theorem 1, ρ satisfies
Let σ 1 be an arbitrary strategy profile for 1, and consider ρ = Out G (σ 1 , σ 2 ). We show that ρ | φ 1 ⇒ φ 2 . Note that player 2 cannot be the first to decrease its value during ρ since it behave according to σ 2 has long has there are no devition, and σ 2 is admissible and admissible strategies do not decrease their own values.
• If player 1 decreases its value during ρ , player 2 will play to make him lose and ρ | φ 1 .
As a consequence ρ | φ 1 ⇒ φ 2 .
• Otherwise no player decreases his own value during ρ . We assume that ρ | φ 1 and show that ρ | φ 2 .
Since ρ | φ 1 , by Lemma 8, there is a strategy τ 1 which is admissible and compatible with ρ . Since ρ is an outcome of σ 2 , and of τ 1 , we have Out G (τ 1 , σ 2 ) = ρ . Now, since τ 1 is admissible and by the fact that σ 2 satisfies the condition 2 of AA, we obtain ρ | φ 2 , which proves the property.
We can show the same property replacing the roles of player 1 and player 2, thus showing that the profile is solution of AG ∧ .
We now consider several non-implications of Fig. 5 . Coop RS ∃ (Dom) Consider the example of Fig. 11 . This example has a solution for
Coop, for instance (l, ac) or (r, bd). However player 2 has no dominant strategy: l looses against bd so it is dominated by r , and r looses against ac so it is dominated by l. Therefore RS ∃ (Dom) has no solution. wins against any of the strategy satisfying these concepts since the only possible outcome is winning for him.
In the controller synthesis framework using two-player games between a controller and its environment, some works advocate the use of environment objectives which the environment can guarantee against any controller [8] . Under this assumption, Win-under-Hyp implies AA: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a novel synthesis rule, called the assume admissible synthesis, for the synthesis of strategies in non-zero sum n players games played on graphs with omega-regular objectives. We use the notion of admissible strategy, a classical concept from game theory, to take into account the objectives of the other players when looking for winning strategy of one player. We have compared our approach with other approaches such as assume guarantee synthesis and rational synthesis that target the similar scientific objectives. We have developed worst-case optimal algorithms to handle our synthesis rule as well as dedicated abstraction techniques. The assume-admissible rule is useful to synthesize meaningful strategies which correctly take other players' expected behaviors into account. Nevertheless, the rule might suffer some limitations that we describe here. First, the restriction to admissible strategies can be questionable in some settings. This assumption is justified when the underlying agents are unknown but can be assumed to act rationally in the sense of admissibility, or simply when we want to actually synthesize a strategy profile and commit to using the AA rule during the whole process. The AA rule cannot be used, for instance, if the behaviors of some agents cannot be determined yet and cannot be assumed to be rational (in the sense of admissibility) either. Another issue is that the rule provides solutions less often than the cooperative synthesis rule in general, and the assume-guarantee rule for the case of two players (see Sect. 8). Hence, the rule might fail to find a solution even though there exists an appropriate strategy profile. A related observation is that since the rule assumes that each agent acts admissibly, the rule might yield sub-optimal solutions if an additional global criterion was given. Indeed, if we were to extend our synthesis problem by adding, say, a global quantitative optimization objective, then restricting to admissible strategies would mean to be sub-optimal in general, while the cooperative synthesis rule can give the optimal solution.
We have seen in Sect. 8 (Theorem 7) that a set of objectives (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n ) not having a solution for the AA rule can still have a solution with the Coop rule or with the AG ∧ rule (for two players). Indeed, because the AA rule leads to solution spaces that are rectangular (Theorem 8), for a AA solution to exist, this requires the objectives to be strong enough so that strategies for each player can be determined compositionally. So, the solution cannot not rely on the synchronization of all the players on particular strategies. Nevertheless, if there exists a Coop solution for objectives (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ), then there always exists a way to reinforce these original objectives so that there exists an AA solution. Indeed, if the regular play w 1 ·(w 2 ) ω is a solution for Coop, then the stronger objectives ({w 1 ·(w 2 ) ω }, . . . , {w 1 ·(w 2 ) ω }) has trivially a solution for the AA rule. As a future work, we will study the problem of reinforcing automatically a specification (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n ) that has no AA rule solution into a new specification (φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ n ) which has a AA solution, while (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) is as weak as possible.
As further future work, we plan to investigate the admissibility notions on quantitative games, and to develop a tool prototype to support our assume admissible synthesis rule.
Appendix 1: Proofs of Sect. 4 Lemma 30 Any strategy for Controller is admissible if, and only if it satisfies (C0), (C1), and (C2) at all histories.
Proof Consider a strategy which does not satisfy the conditions. Note that (C0) cannot be violated. So we consider the two remaining cases.
Consider strategy σ that violates (C1), say, at history h. We define σ = σ [h ← σ C ], and show that σ is dominated by σ . In fact, both strategies are identical on outcomes that do not admit h as prefix. Now, given any strategy τ for Scheduler compatible with h, consider τ = τ [h ← σ S ]. Clearly, all outcomes that extend h and compatible with σ are losing for Controller -since the safety specification fails after h, while the outcomes compatible with σ and τ is winning. This shows that σ dominates σ .
If σ violates (C2), this means that at some history h where a i just became pending, some history h compatible with σ , and extending h for k steps, does not set r i to true although r i is not constantly pending.
Let h denote the longest prefix of h that ends in a Controller state. By assumption r i is not pending at h and σ (h ) does not set r i to true. We define σ identical to σ for all histories that do not admit h as prefix. From history h , σ sets r i to true, and then sets r 3−i to true in the next round, and then always plays ⊥. Consider strategies for User and Scheduler that are compatible with h , and from h , constantly play ⊥ and q 1 q 2 respectively (they are defined arbitrarily elsewhere). It follows that the generated outcome compatible with σ extending h is winning for Controller; while all outcomes of σ extending h are losing since they immediately violate φ Controller . Since all other outcomes of σ which do not extend h are identical to those of σ , this shows that σ is dominated by σ .
Conversely, consider any strategy σ that satisfies (C0)-(C2), and assume, towards a contradiction that there exists σ that dominates σ . Consider any finite history h such that σ (h) = σ (h), and such that σ has an outcome that extends h and satisfies φ Controller . Such a history exists since there is a strategy profile for other players against which σ wins but not σ . Note that φ Controller is not violated by h since σ has a compatible outcome extending h that satisfies this property.
We construct an outcome ρ compatible with σ that extends h and satisfies φ Controller as follows. We set both a 1 , a 2 constantly to false, and q 1 , q 2 to true from history hσ (h), while the variables of Controller are chosen according to σ . Thus, no request is pending when Scheduler plays at history hσ (h). By (C2), the outcome satisfies G(∀i, a i → F ≤k r i ). In fact, we know that the property is satisfiable from h (since σ satisfies it), and none of the requests are pending after hσ (h). Moreover, by (C1), we also have the second part of the formula. Hence, the outcome satisfies φ Controller .
We now prove that σ cannot dominate σ . In fact, let (τ U , τ S ) be a strategy profile compatible with ρ, which at history hσ (h) switches to (σ U ,σ S ). It follows that (σ, τ U , τ S ) | φ Controller while (σ , τ U , τ S ) | φ Controller , a contradiction.
Lemma 31 Any Scheduler strategy is admissible if, and only if it satisfies (C3), (C4), (C5), and (C6) at all histories.
Proof Consider a strategy τ that does not satisfy one of the conditions at history h. Then, all outcomes that extend h are losing for Scheduler since the temporal constraints on both requests cannot be satisfied. We describe a strategy τ that dominates τ . Assume that τ violates (C3) at h. We define τ from τ , which is identical to τ at all histories that do not contain h as prefix. At h, τ sets q 1 to true in the first round, and q 2 in the second round, and continues as σ S . Now, for any strategy of Controller which, at h, plays ⊥ twice, and switches to σ C , all outcomes from h compatible with both described strategies satisfy φ Scheduler . This shows that τ dominates τ . The case of other conditions (C4) or (C5) being violated by τ are treated similarly. Note that (C6) cannot be violated by definition.
Conversely, we show that any strategy τ that satisfy (C3)-(C6) is admissible. Consider any admissible strategy τ that dominates τ ; we will show a contradiction. Note that τ must satisfy all four conditions by the previous case. Let h be a maximal finite prefix compatible with τ and τ with τ (h) = τ (h), and such that some outcome compatible with τ extending h is winning for Scheduler. Such a history exists since the two strategies must be different, and because τ dominates τ .
Define a Controller strategy σ compatible with h, which
• from hτ (h), constantly sets all r i to false, • and from hτ (h), constantly sets all r i to true.
Note that all outcomes are losing from hτ (h) (this behavior corresponds toσ C ). It thus suffices to show that some outcome compatible with τ and σ , and extending hτ (h) is winning for Scheduler to obtain a contradiction. First, observe that no prefix of h satisfies (C6) since from the same history, τ has a winning possible outcome. In particular, this is the case of h itself. Since τ (h) = τ (h) although both satisfy (C3)-(C5), h does not satisfy any of the hypotheses of these conditions. It must be that no request is pending from the previous round (that is, in the previous round, r 2 was false, and either r 1 was false or it was followed by q 1 ). So in the current round, either no request was made, or only one request was made. It follows that any strategy satisfying (C3)-(C5) sets q 1 and q 2 so as to satisfy φ Scheduler , given that no new request is made under σ . Thus, this particular outcome is compatible with τ and satisfies φ Scheduler , contradicting that τ dominates τ .
Lemma 32
For all k ≥ 4, all strategy profiles (σ U , σ C , σ S ) satisfying (C1)-(C6) also satisfy φ User ∧ φ Controller ∧ φ Scheduler . showing that G cannot be used to derive systematically an under-or over-approximation of the set Adm 1 (G).
Consider the game in Fig. 17 , where Player 1 plays from circular states and has the safety objective of avoiding ×. The original game G is given on the left. On the right, G is given, which is obtained by existential abstraction by merging states 1, 2.
We will refer to edges by their labels, and identify strategies with edges since there is a single state for Player 1. We have Adm 1 (G) = {a} but γ (Adm 1 (G)) = {a, b}. In fact, The only edge from state 0 defines an admissible strategy (which is also the only strategy), and both edges a and b of G map to this edge. This shows Adm 1 (G) ⊆ γ (Adm 1 (G)).
As a second example, consider the game of Fig. 18 where the goal is to reach the state . The only admissible strategy in G is taking the edge a, so γ (Adm 1 (G )) = {a}. However, in the original game G , we have Adm 1 (G ) = {a, b} since both are winning. This shows γ (Adm 1 (G )) ⊆ Adm 1 (G ).
More generally, by combining the two small games given here (for instance, taking their union), one can obtain games where Adm 1 (G) and γ (Adm 1 (G)) are incomparable.
